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Abstract The purpose of this study was to perform an
interim evaluation of the policy effect of the current reform
of Japan’s municipal hospitals. We focused on efficiency
improvements both within hospitals and within two separate
internal hospital organizations. Hospitals have two hetero-
geneous internal organizations: the medical examination di-
vision and administration division. The administration divi-
sion carries out business management and the medical-
examination division provides medical care services. We
employed a dynamic-network data envelopment analysis
model (DN model) to perform the evaluation. The model
makes it possible to simultaneously estimate both the effi-
ciencies of separate organizations and the dynamic changes
of the efficiencies. This study is the first empirical applica-
tion of the DN model in the healthcare field. Results showed
that the average overall efficiency obtained with the DN
model was 0.854 for 2007. The dynamic change in efficiency
scores from 2007 to 2009 was slightly lower. The average
efficiency score was 0.862 for 2007 and 0.860 for 2009. The
average estimated efficiency of the administration division
decreased from 0.867 for 2007 to 0.8508 for 2009. In con-
trast, the average efficiency of the medical-examination di-
vision increased from 0.858 for 2007 to 0.870 for 2009. We
were unable to find any significant improvement in efficien-
cy despite the reform policy. Thus, there are no positive
policy effects despite the increased financial support from
the central government.
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1 Introduction
Japanese municipal hospitals have experienced financial cri-
ses throughout the last few decades. In 2007, the Japanese
government established a set of guidelines for municipal
governments for reform and facilitated a restructure of hos-
pital operations. There are 9,000 hospitals in Japan, half of
which are owned by private not-for-profit organizations, and
the remainder is run by public organizations. One thousand
public hospitals are owned and operated by municipal gov-
ernments, most of which have been losing money for some
time. As Japanese local governments have huge cumulative
deficits, it is important that municipal hospitals have sound
financial foundations.
The master plan for the reform of Japan’s municipal hos-
pitals includes five steps from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year
2014 as described below. First, the central government
designed guidelines regarding proposed reforms and a
timeframe for those reforms in 2007. The government ordered
the reform of all municipals hospitals according to the guide-
lines. Therefore, all reforms were to start in fiscal year 2007.
Second, the central government ordered individual mu-
nicipal hospitals to formulate a reform plan, including per-
formance indicators for the evaluation of the reform within
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fiscal year 2008. The contents of the reform plan had some
range of autonomy and municipal hospitals could freely
select countermeasures.
Third, municipal hospitals are required to annually report
the results of the reform plan to central government. The first
report was submitted in fiscal year 2009 (being the first
evaluation of the reform).
Fourth, municipal hospitals were required to submit in-
termediate reports on the results of efficiency promotion
from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2010 at the end of fiscal
year 2011.
Fifth, municipal hospitals are required to submit a final
report on the results of the individual reform plan at the end
of fiscal year 2014. The fiscal year 2014 is the deadline for
the reform. If the reform has not been effective, then central
government will request that the municipal hospital shut
down or sell the operation of the hospital.
As explained above, the guidelines of the reform mainly
target hospital administration because the main objective is
to reduce deficit and to reduce the amount of subsidies
received from local government. The central government is
more interested in the financial situation of the hospital than
the quality of medical services.
The guidelines illustrate several countermeasures for the
reform of municipal hospitals. Such countermeasures can be
grouped into four categories. The first is the introduction of
private business management systems. For example, the
guidelines recommend outsourcing to private companies
and the adoption of a “Private Finance Initiative”. The sec-
ond category is the restructuring and consolidation of the
hospital organization. For example, the guidelines recom-
mend the merging of several hospitals and the conversion of
hospitals into long-term care facilities. The third category
refers to a reduction in hospitals’ operating costs. For exam-
ple, the guidelines propose a revision of wage systems and
reductions in the purchase prices of medical materials. The
fourth category is an increase in revenue. For example, the
guidelines recommend increasing occupancy rates and unit
values per inpatient (nearly equal to “unit revenue per inpa-
tient per day”).
Municipal hospitals can choose the countermeasures from
the examples in the guidelines and can include their own
reform countermeasures. Individual reform plans propose
the recruitment of highly skilled professionals, further edu-
cation for healthcare professionals and a revision of the range
of medical services. Thus, each hospital formulates its own
reform plan and then self evaluates the results.
Harris [1] pointed out that a hospital can be considered as
two separate firms. There are two heterogeneous internal
organizations: a medical-examination division and an ad-
ministration division. The administration division carries
out business management activities to contain medical ex-
penses within medical revenue. The medical-examination
division provides various medical care services directly.
These two organizations can be described as internal mutual
exchange services. The administration division provides
medical beds to the medical-examination division, and the
medical-examination division repays the revenue through
the use of medical beds for inpatient services.
Japanese hospitals have acute beds and long-term care
beds in various ratios. The larger hospitals tend to concen-
trate on acute care services. In addition, physicians and
surgeons are hired and paid by hospitals as in the case of
National Health Service hospitals in the United Kingdom.
These physicians provide services not only to inpatients but
also to outpatients at the same hospitals.
For local residents, many of the problems with municipal
hospitals arise through the curtailment of certain medical
services. Thus, such residents are no longer able to receive
specialized care at those hospitals. The chief medical officer
in charge of the medical-examination division is typically the
target of criticism from the stakeholders of the hospital. The
administration division tends to operate from behind closed
doors and avoids blame for any failures. However, previous
research has not compared efficiency improvements between
the two divisions.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate policy effects of
the reform for municipal hospitals in Japan. We estimated
efficiency scores from 2007 to 2009 not only for the hospital
as a whole but also for two divisions. In addition, we con-
sider further policy implications to address the financial
problems of Japanese municipal hospitals.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The background
and purpose of our study has been discussed in this first
section. The methods and data analyses are discussed in the
second section. The results of the analyses are presented in
the third section. After the estimation of efficiency, we report
the efficiency scores. The last section includes a discussion
of the results and future challenges.
2 Method and data
2.1 Dynamic–network data envelopment analysis (DEA)
2.1.1 Concept of dynamic-network DEA
DEA is a nonparametric method used in operations research
to evaluate the efficiency performance of decision-making
units (DMUs). The traditional DEA model is often consid-
ered a “black-box” model (BB model), because it does not
take account of the internal structure of DMUs. DEA is a
popular method with which to estimate the efficiency of
hospitals [2]. Several previous studies have evaluated the
efficiency of Japanese hospitals using the method [3–6].
These studies used cross-sectional data from Japanese public
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hospitals and adopted largely traditional DEA approaches.
Average efficiency scores ranged from 0.8869 to 0.9456 in
terms of revenue efficiency [3, 4]; for technical efficiency,
they ranged from 0.8585 to 0.90008 [5, 6].
As an extension of the above BB model, the “network
DEA model” accounts for divisional efficiencies as well as
overall efficiency in a unified framework. Through the net-
work DEA model, we can observe not only efficiency of
DMUs but also divisional efficiencies as its components.
Network DEA models were first introduced by Färe and
Grosskopf [7–9]. Their models have been extended by sev-
eral authors. The network DEA model proposed by Lewis
and Sexton [10] presents a multi-stage structure as an exten-
sion of the two-stage DEA model proposed in Sexton and
Lewis [11]. That study solves the DEA model for each node
independently. Prieto and Zofio [12] applied a network effi-
ciency analysis within an input–output model as initiated by
Koopmans [13]. Löthgren and Tambour [14] applied a net-
work DEA model to a sample of Swedish pharmacies with
organizational objectives that necessitated the monitoring of
efficiency, productivity and customer satisfaction. They
compared the results of the network DEA models with those
of traditional DEA models. Tone and Tsutsui [15] developed
this model using a slacks-based measure called the network
slacks-based measure (NSBM) approach. The NSBM is a
non-radial method and is suitable for measuring efficiencies
when inputs and outputs may change non-proportionally.
In contrast, the dynamic DEA model can measure the
efficiency score obtained from long-term optimization using
carry-over variables. The traditional DEA model only focus-
es on a single period, therefore, the measurement of inter-
temporal efficiency change has long been a subject of con-
cern in DEA. The window analysis by Klopp [16] was the
first approach to account for inter-temporal efficiency
change. Based on Malmquist [17], Färe et al. [9] developed
the Malmquist index in the DEA framework. The dynamic
DEA model proposed by Färe and Grosskopf [8] is the first
innovative scheme to formally deal with these inter-
connecting activities. Tone and Tsutsui [15] extended their
model within the slacks-based measurement framework pro-
posed by Tone [18] and Pastor et al. [19]. Hence, the model is
non-radial and can deal with inputs/outputs individually,
which enables us to obtain non-uniform input/output factor
efficiencies. This is contrary to radial approaches, which
assume proportional changes in inputs/outputs and provide
only uniform input/output factor efficiency.
The dynamic–network DEAmodel (DNmodel) takes into
account the internal heterogeneous organizations of DMUs,
where divisions are mutually connected by link variables and
trade internal products with each other. This DN model with
can evaluate (1) the overall efficiency over the entire ob-
served term, (2) dynamic change in the period efficiency and
(3) dynamic change in the divisional efficiency. In addition,
each DMU has carry-over variables that take into account a
positive or negative factor in the previous period.
We employed a dynamic DEA model involving the net-
work structure proposed by Tone and Tsutsui [20]. This
model has the huge advantage of being able to evaluate the
policy effect on the individual divisions of each DMU. Tone
and Tsutsui [20] provides detailed information about the
notation of the DN model.
2.1.2 Formulas for efficiency in the dynamic-network DEA
Notation of inputs, outputs, links, and carry-overs We are
dealing with n DMUs (j=1,…, n), which consist of K divi-
sions (k=1,…, K) over T time periods (t=1,…,T). Letmk and
rk be, respectively, the numbers of inputs and outputs to
division k. We denote the link leading from division k to
division h by (k, h)l and the set of links by Lkh. The observed
data are as follows:
xijk
t ∈R+ (i=1,…,mk; j=1,…,n;k=1,…,K; t=1,…,T) is the
input resource i to DMUj for division k in period t, and
yrjk
t ∈R+(r=1,…,rk;j=1,…,n;k=1,…,K;t=1,…,T) is the
output product r from DMUj, division k in period t.
If some outputs are undesirable, we treat them as inputs to
division k.
ztj khð Þl∈Rþ j ¼ 1;…; n; l ¼ 1;…; Lkh; t ¼ 1;…; Tð Þ rep-
resents the linking intermediate products of DMUj from di-
vision k to division h in period t, where Lkh is the number of
items in the links from k to h.
z t; tþ1ð Þjkl ∈Rþ j ¼ 1;…; n; l ¼ 1;…;Lk ; k ¼ 1;…;K; t ¼ 1;…; T−1ð Þ
is the carry-over of DMUj, at division k from period t to period
t+1, where Lk is the number of items in the carry-over from
division k.
Expression for DMUo DMUo (o=1,…,n)∈Pt can be expressed
as follows. The input and output constraints are
x tok ¼ Xtk λtk þ st−ko ∀k;∀tð Þ
y tok ¼ Ytk λtk − stþko ∀k;∀tð Þ
e λ tk ¼ 1 ∀k;∀tð Þ




ko ≥0; ∀k;∀tð Þ
ð1Þ
where
Xtk ¼ xt1k ;…; xtnk
 
∈Rmkn and Ytk ¼ yt1k ;…; ytnk
 
∈Rrkn
signify the input and output matrices and sko
t− and sko
t+ are,
respectively, the input and output slacks.
With regard to the linking constraints, there are several
options, for which we present four possible cases. There are,
for example, “as input” and “as output” link value cases.
In the “as input” link value case, the linking activities are
treated as an input to the succeeding division, and excesses
are accounted for in the input inefficiency:
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zto khð Þin ¼ Zt khð Þinλtk þ sto khð Þin khð Þin ¼ 1;…; linkinkð Þ ð2Þ
where sto khð Þin∈R
L khð Þin represents slacks and is non-negative,
and linkink is the number of “as input” links from division k.
In the “as output” link value case, the linking activities are
treated as an output from the preceding division, and short-
ages are accounted for in the output inefficiency:
zto khð Þout ¼ Zt khð Þoutλtk−sto khð Þout khð Þout ¼ 1;…; linkoutkð Þ ð3Þ
where sto khð Þout∈R
L khð Þout represents slacks and is non-negative
and linkoutk is the number of “as output” links from division k.
We classify carry-over activities into four categories as
follows. Corresponding to each category of carry-over, we
derive the following equations:








kl ¼ 1;…; ngoodk ;∀k; ∀tð Þ





λtjk þ s t; tþ1ð Þoklbad kl ¼ 1;…; nbadk ;∀k; ∀tð Þ





λtjk þ s t; tþ1ð Þokl free kl ¼ 1;…; nfreek ; ∀k; ∀tð Þ





λtjk kl ¼ 1;…; nfixk ; ∀k; ∀tð Þ
s t; tþ1ð Þoklgood ≥ 0 ; s
t; tþ1ð Þ
oklbad
≥ 0 and s t; tþ1ð Þokl free : free ∀kl;∀tð Þ
ð4Þ
where s t; tþ1ð Þoklgood ; s
t; tþ1ð Þ
oklbad
and s t; tþ1ð Þokl free represent slacks
denoting, respectively, carry-over shortfall, carry-over excess,
and carry-over deviation; and ngoodk, nbadk, and nfreek indicate,
respectively, the number of desirable (good), undesirable (bad),
and free carry-overs for each division k. The notation for data and
variables is summarized in Table 1.
Objective function for overall efficiency, period efficiency,
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Table 1 Notation of data and
variables in DN model Data
Input xijk
t Input resource i to DMUj for division k at period t
Output yrjk
t Output product r from DMUj for division k at period t
Link
ztj khð Þl
Linking intermediate product of DMUj from division k to division h at period t
Carry-over
z t; tþ1ð Þjkl
Carry-over of DMUj at division k from period t to period t+1
Variable
Input slack siok
t− Slack of input i of DMUo for division k at period t.
Output slack srok
t+ Slack of output r of DMUo for division k at period t.
Link slack
sto khð Þlα
Slack of link (kh)l of DMUo at period t.





Slack of carry-over k l from period t to period t+1.
α stands for free, good and bad.
Intensity λjk
t Intensity of DMUj corresponding to division k at period t
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subject to (1) to (4), whereWt(∀t) is the weight to period t and
wk(∀k) is the weight to division k. These weights satisfy the
condition ∑ t=1T W t=1, ∑ k=1K w k=1, W t≥ 0(∀t), wk≥ 0 (∀k).
They are supplied exogenously. The numerator includes terms
associated with relative slacks of inputs (“as-input” links and
bad carry-overs), whereas the denominator includes relative
slacks of output (“as-output” links and good carry-overs).
They are weighted by the divisional weight wk and further
by the period weight W t, and they result in the overall effi-
ciency θo
∗. This objective function is a generalization of the
slacks-based measure developed by Tone [18]. The divisional
weights indicate the importance of the division, e.g., cost and
manpower, whereas the period weights reflect, for ex-
ample, discount rate by period. θo
∗≤1 and θo∗=1 hold if
and only if all slacks are zero. The input-/output-orient-
ed model can be defined by dealing with the numerator/
denominator of the above objective function. Utilizing
the optimal slacks obtained by solving program (5), we
define the period and divisional efficiencies as follows.
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where variables on the right-hand side indicate optimal
values for the overall efficiency θo
∗.














sto khð Þl in

























 !" # ∀kð Þ ð7Þ












sto khð Þl in























 ! ∀k;∀tð Þ ð8Þ
In the input-/output-oriented model, the numera-
tor/denominator of the above formulas is applied.
2.1.3 Adopted variables of dynamic-network DEA
The DN model makes it possible to have a two-stage pro-
duction structure in one hospital, that is, both the adminis-
tration division and medical-examination division. The ad-
ministration division raises funds for and maintains medical
beds. The medical-examination division uses the medical
beds and provides medical services. Furthermore, the
medical-examination division earns medical revenue in
return for medical services and the administration division
collects the revenue from the medical-examination division
and manages financial matters. Previous literature that
adopted BB models in the study of Japanese hospitals did
not consider intermediate products in a hospital. In case of
the DN model, we can use link variables as intermediate
products for both divisions. This benefit of the DN model
(compared with the BB model) is that it makes it possible to
reflect on the actual situation. We adopted two link variables
in our model.
In addition, if we add variables related to the administra-
tion division in the BB model, we would suffer from inade-
quate correspondence between inputs and outputs. For
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example, the administration staff does not directly engage in
the production of medical services. In the case of the BB
model, this input may correspond with the number of inpa-
tients as an output. However, the relationship between the
administration staff and the number of inpatients would
cause an undesirable bias in the efficiency estimation. There-
fore, the DN model conceptually reduces bias (compared
with the BB model) in the estimation of efficiency by both
considering the multiple-step production structure and by
excluding inadequate interactions between inputs and out-
puts. However, we do not consider more detailed divisions in
this study. For example, we did not consider pharmaceutical
or clinical laboratory divisions.
2.2 Empirical data
The data used in this empirical investigation concerns 112
municipal hospitals from 2007 to 2009 in a balanced panel.
There are approximately 1,000 municipal hospitals in Japan
and there is large heterogeneity among them. We selected
municipal hospitals with more than 300 beds. Therefore, this
sample may represent larger acute hospitals owned by Japa-
nese municipals. The data were collected from the Annual
Databook of Local Public Enterprise published by the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs and Communications. It is a legal
requirement that the local chief executive of municipal gov-
ernments submit audited financial statements to the ministry.
Therefore, the data should be accurate. Accuracy is required
for DEA because it cannot take into account measurement
errors in the data. DEA also implicitly assumes the correct
model specification and the correct specification of inputs,
outputs and other variables.
The objective function of the administration division is to
realize a sound financial situation through labor inputs and
capital inputs. The objective function of the medical-
examination division is to provide a certain amount of med-
ical services using hospital beds that are maintained by the
administration division at the same hospital.
Many previous studies that have adopted BB models to
examine Japanese hospitals have focused on the activities of
the medical-examination division. These studies typically
adopt the number of doctors and nurses as inputs and the
number of inpatients and outpatients as outputs. Therefore,
such studies do not contain the activities of the administration
division, by way of either input variable or output variable.
However, the DN model enables us to consider activities in
both divisions. We can observe the activities of the administra-
tion division separately from themedical-examination division.
The inputs, outputs, links and carry-overs of the DN
model are described below. For Division 1 (administration
division), we adopted two labor inputs and three capital
inputs. The administration division does not directly provide
a medical service to patients. The division is in charge of
providing medical beds to the medical-examination division
and maintains a sound financial situation for the hospital.
Therefore, administration staffs should manage the financial
situation of the hospital. They also receive subsidies from the
municipal government and manage the reimbursement of
issued hospital bonds. Maintenance staffs maintain all the
hospital buildings for hospital activities. As labor inputs, we
used both the number of administration officers and the
number of maintenance officers. All labor inputs are full-
time equivalents (FTEs). However, we did not consider staff
differences in productivity and wage levels. As capital in-
puts, we used the interest cost for financial arrangements and
municipal subsidies to cover deficits.
For the output of Division 1, we intended to adopt the
“balance ratio of medical incomes to medical expenses”; the
break-even point has a value of 1 and a surplus has a value
exceeding 1. However, using a ratio as an input or output
makes the convexity issue of DEA problematic [21].
Emrouznejad and Amin [22] recommended not using constant
returns to scale when there is a ratio in the input/output vari-
ables. Therefore, we decomposed the ratio to medical income
and medical expenses: the numerator was used as output for
Division 1 and the denominator as input for Division 1.
For Division 2 (the medical-examination division), we
adopted four labor inputs: the number of doctors, number of
nurses, number of assistant nurses and number of medical
technologists. All labor inputs are FTEs. For the outputs of
Division 2, we adopted the number of inpatients per operation
day, the number of outpatients per operation day and the
number of beds in emergency units. In Japan, there is no
gate-keeping system involving general practitioners. There-
fore, hospitals accept a large number of outpatients to attract
potential inpatients. In this study the number of beds in emer-
gency units was used as a surrogate variable for emergency
care service because we could not distinguish between emer-
gency care patients and ordinary patients from the data source.
Previous studies regarding efficiency estimations on Jap-
anese hospitals did not include emergency medical services.
A core function of public hospitals in Japan is to ensure a
quick response for emergency patients. However, some mu-
nicipal hospitals have closed their emergency units to reduce
costs despite the increasing need for emergency medical
services. Although we consider that the evaluation of effi-
ciency of municipal hospitals should include the number of
emergency patients, we were not able to obtain numbers
from the available data. Therefore, we adopted the number
of emergency beds as a proxy for the number of emergency
patients. This proxy variable has limitations because it did
not control for the difference in severity of emergency pa-
tients, the quality of emergency medical service and the
occupancy rate of the emergency beds.
The existence of a link variable is one of the key differences
between the DNmodel and the BBmodel. The link variable is
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an intermediate product that acts simultaneously as an output
for Division 1 and an input to Division 2. Using an interme-
diate product, we can evaluate multiple production steps
among divisions in one DMU. Tone and Tsutsui [20] present
four possible scenarios. For example, the “fixed link value
case” means that the linking activities are unchanged.
We set the “number of beds” as a link variable from
Division 1 to Division 2. We assumed that Division 1 is in
charge of the funding and maintenance of medical beds.
Division 1 supplies these beds to Division 2. Division 2 uses
the medical beds and delivers medical care services to pa-
tients. We adopted a non-discretionary “fixed” link, where
the linking activity remains the same. The reason for this is
that it would be unusual for the medical-examination divi-
sion to negotiate with the administration division to change
the number of beds. The administration division also has an
incentive to generate sufficient medical revenue (to offset the
medical expenses) and to use all available beds.
We used “average revenue per inpatient per day” as a link
variable from Division 2 to Division 1. We assumed that the
average revenue is the consideration to be paid to Division 1
for the beds from Division 2. The average revenue per
inpatient may represent the density of medical care services.
We adopted the “as-output” link, where the linking activity is
treated as an output from Division 1. The reason for this is
that this matter is not negotiable between the two divisions.
Division 1 should be efficient enough to provide higher
density medical services under the given resource concen-
trations (Fig. 1).
The carry-over variable is one of the benefits of using a
DN model compared with a BB model. A DMU ordinarily
continues activities over several terms. Furthermore, some
inter-temporal factors can affect its efficiencies. The carry-
over variable makes it possible to account for the effect from
connecting activities between continuing terms. The carry-
over variable has four characteristics in Tone and Tsutsui
[20]. For example, “desirable (good) carry-over” variables
are treated as outputs and a comparative shortage of carry-
overs is seen as inefficiency.
We set the “balance account of the public enterprise bond
(hospital bond)” as an undesirable (bad) carry-over. The
hospital bond was chosen as the carry-over because munic-
ipal hospitals issue these bonds to raise funds for capital
investment in terms of hospital beds. The municipal hospital
gradually redeems the issued bond from any revenue surplus.
We adopted the “undesirable (bad)” carry-over; thus, the
connecting activity from Period 1 to Period 2 is treated as
an input. The reason for this is that newly built hospitals are
more attractive to patients but represent a heavier fiscal
burden in terms of repaying the principal. Therefore, to treat
the public enterprise bond as a carry-over reflects accurately
the competitive condition of the market in which patients can
freely access any hospital. However, we did not consider
both the average life and interest rate of the hospital bonds.
According to the first principle that a public hospital is
expected to accomplish a policy goal with a minimum bud-
get, we selected an input-oriented model. We adopted both
constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale
(VRS) models in the analysis. Descriptive statistics of all
variables in the analysis are provided in Table 2.
Figure 2 shows the structure of the BB model. The inputs
and outputs of the BB model are exactly the same as those of
the DN model. The inputs are denoted as Input 1 to Input 9.
The outputs are denoted as Output 10 to Output 13 as in
Table 2. The variables for links and carry-overs do not apply
in the case of the BB model.
3 Results
The right side of Table 3 presents the key statistics of the











































Fig. 1 Structure of the dynamic and network data envelopment analy-
sis model. We estimated the efficiency of Japanese municipal hospitals
in two parts. The first division is the administration division, which is
responsible for financial management. The second division is the med-
ical-examination division, which directly provides a medical service.
There are two links between the divisions. The number of beds is a link
from Division 1 to Division 2. The average revenue per inpatient per
day is a link from Division 2 to Division 1. The dynamic-network data
envelopment analysis model also indicates the relationship between the
two divisions in terms of efficiency improvement from 1 year to the
next. The carry-over variable is used to represent the inter-temporal
relationship
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those of the BB model are shown on the left. The average
efficiency score estimated by the BB model is 0.988 in 2007
and is higher than the average efficiency estimated in previ-
ous studies on Japanese municipal hospitals. We suspect that
the reason for this is the higher number of variables used in
the model.
On the right of Table 3, the first row shows the efficiency
scores of the overall hospital organization as determined by
the DNmodel. The second row shows the efficiency scores of
the administration divisions of the sample hospitals. The third
row shows the efficiency scores of the medical-examination
divisions of the sample hospitals. From the results of DN
model, we obtained four key findings.
First, the average overall efficiency obtained with the DN
model was 0.854 (VRS model) for 2007. The average effi-
ciency score estimated by the DNmodel was smaller than the
average efficiency estimated in previous studies on Japanese
municipal hospitals [3–6]. In the same year, the ratio of
efficient DMUs was 39.0 %.
Second, the dynamic change in efficiency scores from
2007 to 2009 is slightly less. The average efficiency score
was 0.862 for 2007 and 0.860 for 2009 (VRS model).
Third, because of the advantage of the network structure
in the DN model, we can observe the efficiency change
separately for different internal organizations. The average
level of estimated period-divisional efficiency of the admin-
istration division decreased from 0.867 in 2007 to 0.8508 in
2009 (VRS model). In contrast, the average period-
divisional efficiency of the medical-examination division
increased from 0.858 in 2007 to 0.870 in 2009 (VRS model).
On average, there was no significant efficiency change in
both divisions for the 3-year period.
The Pearson’s product–moment correlation coefficient of
period-divisional efficiency scores on 2009 between the two
divisions was 0.569 (statistically significant at p<0.01). The
value of the Spearman’s rank-correlation coefficient was
0.597 (statistically significant at p<0.01). Thus, there was
only a weak correlation between the period-divisional effi-
ciencies in each division (Fig. 3).
In addition, we investigated individual hospitals in terms
of the relationship between the dynamic changes of period-
divisional efficiencies of two divisions between 2007 and
Table 2 Basic description of variables
Variable names Average S.D. Max Min Units
Division1 Input ① Number of administration officers 29.35 13.14 89.00 9.00 Person
② Number of maintenance officers 17.96 15.54 83.00 0.00 Person
③ Interest cost per year 510.15 394.23 1,666.92 0.80 Milion Yen
④ Subsidy from municipal 23.68 17.59 89.70 2.80 Milion Yen
⑤ Medical expense 9,531 5,232 28,286 2,048 Milion Yen
Output ⑩ Medical income 8,355 4,853 24,769 1,314 Milion Yen
Link(Div1→Div2) Number of beds 482 180 1334 300 Unite
Division2 Input ⑥ Number of doctors 62.17 35.89 166.00 6.00 Person
⑦ Number of nurses 314.41 152.76 800.00 79.00 Person
⑧ Number of assistant nurses 5.33 6.45 46.00 0.00 Person
⑨ Number of medical technologist 65.77 32.61 171.00 8.00 Person
Output ⑪ Number of inpatients per an operation day 378.14 156.79 964.00 73.00 Person
⑫ Number of outpatients per an operation day 742.14 425.64 2224.00 19.00 Person
⑬ Number of beds for emergency unites 14.09 14.73 66.00 0.00 Unite
Link(Div2→Div1) Average revenue per inpatient per day 16,822 6,629 31,841 3,661 Yen













Fig. 2 Structure of the black box (BB model). The inputs and outputs
of the BB model are exactly the same as those of the dynamic-network
(DN model). The inputs are denoted Input① to Input⑨. The outputs
are denoted Output⑩ to Output⑬. The variables for links and carry-
over do not apply in the case of the BB model
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2009. We separated all sample hospitals into four areas. Area
1 is low efficiency improvement (less than or equal to 0) in
Division 1 and high efficiency improvement (more than 0) in
Division 2. The number of hospitals located in Area 1 was 19
(16.96 % of sample hospitals).
Area 2 is high efficiency improvement in Division 1 and
high efficiency improvement in Division 2. The number of
hospitals located in Area 2 was 18 (16.07 % of sample
hospitals). Area 3 is low efficiency improvement in Division
1 and low efficiency improvement in Division 2. The number
of hospitals located in Area 3 was 66 (58.92 % of sample
hospitals). Area 4 is high efficiency improvement in Division
1 and low efficiency improvement in Division 2. The number
of hospitals located in Area 4 was 9 (8.03 % of sample
hospitals). These results indicated that more than half of the
sample hospitals had no improvement in efficiency scores in
both divisions (Fig. 4).
We also examined the difference in characteristics of the
above four areas by comparing the average values of vari-
ables used to estimate the efficiency scores. We conducted
Tukey’s honestly significant difference test on those values.
The results showed a statistical difference only for “the
number of medical technologists” between Area 3 and Area
4. Otherwise, we found no particular differences in the
characteristics among the four areas (Table 4).
4 Discussion
There are two heterogeneous internal organizations in Japa-
nese municipal hospitals. The first is the administration divi-
sion, which is responsible for financial management. The
second is the medical-examination division, which provides
medical services. The purpose of this study was to separately
assess the changes in the dynamic efficiency of the two
internal organizations. In this study, we estimated the dynamic
change of efficiency scores of Japanese municipal hospitals in
terms of these two divisions (Division 1: administration divi-
sion; Division 2: medical-examination division).
We employed the DN model as presented by Tone and
Tsutsui [20]. Based on our results, we obtained three policy
implications. First, the dynamic change in period-divisional
Table 3 Efficiency scores obtained from the DN model and BB model
Black box DEA model Dynamic-network DEA model
Model Year 2007 2008 2009 Division Model Year 2007 2008 2009
CRS-I Average 0.9742 0.9725 0.9736 Overall CRS-I Average 0.7633 0.7714 0.7824
SD 0.0634 0.0610 0.0578 SD 0.1663 0.1618 0.1669
Maximum 1 1 1 Maximum 1 1 1
Minimum 0.6447 0.6807 0.6487 Minimum 0.3339 0.3175 0.4249
VRS-I Average 0.9876 0.9869 0.9881 VRS-I Average 0.8624 0.8612 0.8600
SD 0.0402 0.0361 0.0359 SD 0.1422 0.1463 0.1476
Maximum 1 1 1 Maximum 1 1 1
Minimum 0.7980 0.8140 0.7955 Minimum 0.4868 0.4879 0.4992
Division1 (admin) CRS-I Average 0.7705 0.7742 0.7810
SD 0.2079 0.2025 0.2088
Maximum 1 1 1
Minimum 0.2706 0.2268 0.2664
VRS-I Average 0.8667 0.8533 0.8508
SD 0.1650 0.1837 0.1813
Maximum 1 1 1
Minimum 0.3965 0.4061 0.4284
Division 2 (medical) CRS-I Average 0.7560 0.7686 0.7838
SD 0.1726 0.1696 0.1723
Maximum 1 1 1
Minimum 0.3669 0.4082 0.4122
VRS-I Average 0.8581 0.8691 0.8693
SD 0.1530 0.1487 0.1516
Maximum 1 1 1
Minimum 0.4835 0.5172 0.4795
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efficiency scores from 2007 to 2009 was quite small in both
divisions. Therefore, on average, we could not find a positive
policy effect on Japanese municipal hospitals.
Second, when we looked at individual hospitals, a DMU
with an efficient medical-examination division sometimes had

























Fig. 3 The scatter plot shows the
estimated efficiency scores for
the two divisions obtained with
the dynamic and network data
envelopment analysis model
(DN model). The horizontal axis
represents the average efficiency
score of Division 1
(administration division). The
vertical axis indicates the
individual efficiency score of
Division 2 (medical-examination
division). These two efficiency






















Fig. 4 The scatter plot shows the
dynamic change in efficiency
scores from 2007 to 2009. The
horizontal axis represents the
dynamic change in the efficiency
score of Division 1
(administration division). The
vertical axis indicates the
dynamic change of the efficiency
score in Division 2 (medical-
examination division). The
dynamic changes in the
efficiency scores of the two
divisions tend to be separated
into four areas
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not show strong correlation between the efficiency scores of
the administration division and medical-examination division.
The Pearson’s product–moment correlation coefficient of the
efficiency scores between the two divisions for 2009 was
0.569 (statistically significant at p<0.01). The value of the
Spearman’s rank-correlation coefficient was 0.597 (statistical-
ly significant at p<0.01).
Third, we also focused on the efficiency improvements of
the two divisions in terms of individual hospitals. The ratio of
sample hospitals where both divisions improved their efficien-
cy score was 16.96%. In contrast, the ratio of sample hospitals
where both divisions maintained or had reduced efficiency
scores was 58.92 %. The ratio of sample hospitals where the
direction of change differed for the two divisions was
24.12 %. Among these hospitals, the hospitals’ worsening
efficiency scores in the administration division was twice that
of hospitals’ worsening efficiency score in the medical-
examination division. It would be misleading to use the
change in average efficiency scores to evaluate policy effects.
From these results, we note that we did not find any
significant improvement in efficiency despite the implemented
policy for reform. Thus, we found that there are no positive
policy effects on average despite the financial support from
central government. In terms of further reform, appropriate
countermeasures for different internal organizations should be
implemented, taking into account the efficiency improvement
to-date of each division.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication
(2011) established the following two points in a sample
survey of annual reports from fiscal 2009 of municipal
hospitals [23]. First, almost all such hospitals did not achieve
the targets that had been set for that year. Second, as an interim
evaluation, the ministry concluded that reformation of munic-
ipal hospitals should be considered and effective measures
implemented.
This study is the first empirical application of the DN
model, and thus there are limitations that need to be addressed.
For example, we were unable to use variables regarding the
“quality” of medical services and the “severity” of patient
condition. Therefore, we assumed that the sample hospitals
would be homogeneous in terms of quality of service and
severity of patient condition. We could, however, narrow the
range of samples according to the number of hospital beds to
ensure the homogeneity of the sample hospitals on some level.
We should also examine omitted variables, e.g., the presence
of large and costly medical devices such as magnetic reso-
nance imagers. However, it is difficult to introduce criteria for
determining which device should be included in the input or
output of the production function.We used the number of beds
in emergency units as an output and used total number of
medical beds as the link variable. This double counting of
medical beds could affect the results in some way.
There are other limitations regarding the control of several
factors, which would influence to the estimated efficiencies.
For example, the price of medical services, which is insured
by public health insurance, changes every 2 years in Japan.
The price increased on average by 2 % in fiscal year 2008.
Many Japanese acute hospitals decided to voluntarily change
their reimbursement system from “fee for service” to “per
diem based on diagnosis groups”. This study did not fully
consider these external environmental changes in the Japa-
nese hospital market.
Table 4 Average values of vari-
ables in the four areas
Significance level * p<0.05
Area1 Area2 Area3 Area4
Number of administration officers 30.26 31.56 28.47 35.78
Number of maintenance officers 12.84 20.33 15.64 22.89
Interest cost per year 390.32 448.35 483.82 511.72
Subsidy from municipal 27.33 27.31 22.94 16.7
Medical expense 10,096,832 9,304,397 9,603,294 12,629,624
Medical income 8,538,576 8,348,293 8,655,323 11,401,202
Number of beds 474 439.17 480.09 559.11
Number of doctors 64.21 61.67 62.26 84.78
Number of nurses 313.95 323.33 311.68 424.56
Number of assistant nurses 2.63 5.28 4.85 3
Number of medical technologist 69.11 68.78 61.95* 93.78*
Number of inpatients per an operation day 346.79 355.5 371.26 445
Number of outpatients per an operation day 680.79 677.22 721.39 1015.89
Number of beds for emergency unites 9.53 10.5 15.58 22.67
Average revenue per inpatient per day 17,387 18,289 16,759 20,194
Balance account of the public enterprise 938,937 253,166 699,074 357,156
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Regarding policy implications, we did not consider both
the relative costs of the two divisions and the relative costs to
improve efficiency in each division. For example, one divi-
sion may be less efficient on average, but the other may be
more costly so that a given efficiency improvement is more
beneficial. When playing an active role in policy implemen-
tation, we need to consider relative costs in addition to the
efficiency scores.
Future study will require a larger sample set and a more
complex model.
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